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Abstract
In this paper, we study the Reaching Stable Marriage via Divorce Operations
problem, which given a Stable Marriage instance and an initial matching, asks whether a
stable matching for the instance is reachable by a sequence of divorce operations as introduced by
Tamura [6]. We show that for incomplete preferences with ties, Reaching Stable Marriage
via Divorce Operations is NP-complete.
1 Introduction
In the Stable Marriage problem, we are given two disjoint sets of agents, U and W , which we
refer to as to the set of men and the set of women, respectively. Each agent from either set has a
preference list (that may be incomplete and contain ties) on the agents from the opposite set. The
goal is to search for a stable matching M , that is, a set M of disjoint pairs of agents such that the
agents in each pair find each other acceptable and no unmatched pair is a blocking pair with respect
to M . Herein, a blocking pair {u,w} with respect to a matching M is a pair not in M such that
the following is fulfilled.
1. u is either unmatched or prefers to be with w than with the agent matched by M , and
2. w is either unmatched or prefers to be with u than with the agent matched by M .
In this paper, we study the computational complexity of a variant of the Stable Marriage
problem, called Reaching Stable Marriage via Divorce Operations, which, given an in-
stance of Stable Marriage I = (U,W, (x)x∈U∪W ) and a matching M0, asks whether there is
a stable matching M` for I which is reachable from M0. Here, a matching M is reachable from
M if there is a sequence (p0, p1, . . . , p`−1) of pairs of agents, where for each pair pi = {ui, wi},
0 ≤ i ≤ `− 1, the following holds.
• Mi+1 is a matching for I and is recursively defined as
Mi+1 := Mi − {ui,Mi(ui)} − {Mi(wi), wi}+ {ui, wi}+ {Mi(wi),Mi(ui)}, and
• the pair pi is blocking matching Mi, and
• M = M`.
For a matching M and a pair p = {u,w} of agents such that u and w are matched under M , we
use b-inter(M,p) to denote the set resulting from M by replacing the pairs {u,M(u)} and {M(w), w}
in matching M with {u,w} and {M(w),M(u)}, while keeping the other pairs unchanged. Formally,
b-inter(M,p = {u,w}) := M − {u,M(u)} − {M(w), w}+ {u,w}+ {M(w),M(u)}.
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If p is blocking M and the set b-inter(M,p) remains a matching, then the above operation is called
b-interchange by p for M [6].
The problem that we study in this paper is defined as follows.
Reaching Stable Marriage via Divorce Operations
Input: A Stable Marriage instance (possibly with ties and incomplete preferences) I =
(U,W, (x)x∈U∪W ), a matching M0
Question: Does I admit a stable matching which is reachable from M0?
Example 1. For an illustration, let us consider the following instance from Tamura [6], with four
agents on each side, i.e., U = {u1, u2, u3, u4} and W = {w1, w2, w3, w4}.
u1 : w1  w3  w2  w4
u2 : w2  w4  w3  w1
u3 : w3  w1  w4  w2
u4 : w4  w2  w1  w3
w1 : u2  u4  u1  u3
w2 : u3  u1  u2  u4
w3 : u4  u2  u3  u1
w4 : u1  u3  u4  u2
Let M0 be a matching with M0 = {{u1, w1}, {u2, w4}, {u3, w3}, {u4, w2}}. It has two blocking
pairs p = {u2, w2} and q = {u4, w4}. Using either for a b-interchange leads to the stable (in fact
the man-optimal) matching M = {{ui, wi}}i∈[4].
Knuth [3] was the first to ask whether, given a divorce graph, there is a path to a sink from
every vertex that corresponds to a matching in a Stable Marriage instance. The divorce graph
for a Stable Marriage instance with n men and n women is a directed graph which has a vertex
for each possible matching between the men and the women, and has an arc (u, v) from a vertex u
to another vertex v if there is a blocking pair p for the matching Mu represented by vertex u
such that performing the b-interchange by p results in a matching Mv represented by vertex v,
i.e., Mv = b-inter(Mu, p). By definition, every sink in the divorce graph corresponds to a stable
matching. Knuth [3] observed that the divorce graph may contain cycles so that not every path
from a vertex leads to sink. Gusfield and Irving [2] asked whether the divorce graph may have some
specific structure that helps in identifying a path that leads to a sink.
Tamura [6] provided a construction that, for each number n ≥ 4, produces an instance with
n agents on each side for which there is a matching that does not lead to a stable matching by
performing any b-interchanges. This instance with n = 4 is depicted in Example 1 (also see [6,
Fig. 4]). If we start with matching N0 = {{u1, w1}, {u2, w2}, {u3, w4}, {u4, w3}}, then no matter
what b-interchanges we perform, we will never reach a stable matching. For more details, please refer
to the work of Tamura [6]. He also provided an algorithm that transforms an arbitrary matching
into a stable one by using operations that are not only b-interchanges. His algorithm does not
necessarily run in polynomial time. Independently, Tan and Su [7] provided a different instance
with four agents on each side where there is a matching for which no b-interchange path leads to
a stable matching. They also showed that for any instance with at most three agents on each side,
an arbitrary matching can always be transformed into a stable one by using only b-interchanges.
Similarly, they also provided an algorithm that transforms an arbitrary matching into a stable one
while using not exclusively b-interchanges. For instance, they do not require the “divorcees” to be
matched together as we do in this paper. See Roth and Vate [5], Cheng [1] and [4, Section 2.6] for
more details in this setting.
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2 NP-hardness for Reaching Stable Marriage via Divorce Opera-
tions with Ties and Incomplete Preferences
In this section, we show that transforming an arbitrary matching into a stable matching via b-
interchanges is NP-hard.
Theorem 1. For incomplete preferences with ties, Reaching Stable Marriage via Divorce
Operations is NP-complete.
Proof. We reduce from Independent Set, which, given an n-vertex graph G = (V,E) with vertex
set V and edge set E, and a number k ∈ N, asks whether G admits a k-vertex independent set , a
vertex subset V ′ ⊆ V with k pairwise non-adjacent vertices.
Let V = {v1, . . . , vn} and E = {e1, . . . , em}. Our Reaching Stable Marriage via Divorce
Operations instance consists of two disjoint sets of agents, U and W , with U = V ∪E∪F∪A∪X∪C
and W = S ∪ T ∪B ∪ EV ∪ Y ∪D, where
– F = {fj | ej ∈ E},
– A = {ai | vi ∈ V } and B = {bi | vi ∈ V }
– X = {xj | ej ∈ E} and Y = {yj | ej ∈ E},
– C = {cj | ej ∈ E} and D = {dj | ej ∈ E},
– EV = {evj | ej ∈ E and v ∈ ej}, and
– S = {si | 1 ≤ i ≤ k} and T = {ti | 1 ≤ i ≤ n− k}.
In total, there are 4m + 2n agents on each side. We will construct the preferences and an initial
matching M0 such that each stable matching reachable from M0 must match a vertex agent vi to
someone from S ∪ T , and the k agents that are matched to S correspond to an independent set. In
the following, we use round parentheses to express that the agents listed inside the parentheses are
tied as partners, and square brackets to refer to an arbitrary but fixed strict order.
Preferences for U .
∀i ∈ [n] : vi : (T )  (E(vi))  (S)  bi, where E(vi) = {evij | vi ∈ ej for some ej ∈ E},
∀i ∈ [k] : ai : (B)  si,
∀i ∈ [n− k] : ai+k : (B)  ti,
∀j ∈ [m] : ej : (evj , ev
′
j )  yj , where ej = {v, v′} ∈ E,
∀j ∈ [m] : fj : (evj , ev
′
j )  dj , where ej = {v, v′} ∈ E,
∀j ∈ [m] : xj : yj  (evj , ev
′
j )  dj , where ej = {v, v′} ∈ E,
∀j ∈ [m] : cj : dj  (evj , ev
′
j )  yj where ej = {v, v′} ∈ E.
Preferences for W .
∀i ∈ [k] : si : [V ]  ai,
∀i ∈ [n− k] : ti : (V )  ai+k,
∀i ∈ [n] : bi : [A]  vi,
∀j ∈ [m], ∀v ∈ ej : evj : ej  v  fj  cj  xj ,
∀j ∈ [m] : yj : xj  ej  cj ,
∀j ∈ [m] : dj : cj  fj  [evj , ev
′
j ], where ej = {v, v′} ∈ E.
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Initial matching M0. To complete the construction we set the initial matching M0 as follows.
(i) For each vi ∈ V , let M0(vi) = bi.
(ii) For each ai ∈ A, let M0(ai) = si if 1 ≤ i ≤ k, and let M0(ai) = ti−k otherwise.
(iii) For each ej ∈ E with ej = {v, v′}, select an arbitrary but fixed order for (v, v′) and let
M0(xj) = e
v
j and M0(cj) = e
v′
j .
(iv) For each ej ∈ E let M0(ej) = yj and for each fj ∈ F let M0(fj) = dj .
Before we continue with the construction, we observe the following properties that each stable
matching reachable from M0 must satisfy.
Claim 1. Let M be a stable matching for our constructed instance which is reachable from M0.
Then, M satisfies the following properties:
1. For each ai ∈ A, it holds that M(ai) ∈ B.
2. For each xj ∈ X, it holds that M(xj) = yj.
3. For each cj ∈ C, it holds that M(cj) = dj.
4. For each ti ∈ T , it holds that M(ti) ∈ V .
5. For each si ∈ S, it holds that M(si) ∈ V .
6. For each vi ∈ V with M(vi) ∈ S and for each edge ej with ej = {vi, v`}, it holds that
M(ej) = e
vi
j and M(v`) ∈ T .
Proof. Since M is stable, the first four statements are straight-forward to verify. As for the fifth
statement, suppose for the sake of contradiction that there exists an agent s ∈ S such thatM(s) /∈ V ,
implying that s is unmatched under M . By the preferences of the vertex agents and by the stability
of M it must hold that there exists a vertex agent vi ∈ V such that M(vi) ∈ E(vi), say M(vi) = evij
for some edge ej with vi ∈ ej . Since M is a stable matching reachable from M0, by definition, there
exists a sequence ξ = (M0,M1, . . . ,M`) of matchings and a sequence (p0, p1, . . . , p`−1) of blocking
pairs such that for each 0 ≤ i ≤ `− 1,
• Mi+1 = b-inter(Mi, pi) such that Mi+1 is a matching for our constructed instance, and
• the pair pi is blocking Mi, and
• M = M`.
Since M0(vi) 6= evij , by the definition of reachability, there exist two consecutive matchings Mh and
Mh+1 in sequence ξ, 0 ≤ h ≤ ` − 1 such that Mh(vi) 6= evij and Mh+1(vi) = evij . By the definition
of b-inter, it must hold that Mh(e
vi
j ) and Mh(vi) are matched with each other in Mh+1. On the
one hand, by the preferences of evij , we have that Mh(e
vi
j ) ∈ {ej , fj , cj , xj}; note that Mh(evij ) 6= vi.
On the other hand, by the preferences of vi, we have that Mh(vi) ∈ {bi} ∪ S ∪ T ∪ E(vi) \ {evij }.
However, no agent from {ej , fj , cj , xj} finds any agent from {bi} ∪ S ∪ T ∪E(vi) \ {evij } acceptable,
implying that Mh(e
vi
j ) and Mh(vi) can never be matched with each other, a contradiction.
It remains to show the last statement. Assume that vi is an agent with M(vi) ∈ S and consider
an arbitrary edge ej with ej = {vi, v`}. Since vi prefers evij to his partner M(vi), to make M stable,
agent evij must be assigned a partner M(e
vi
j ) that is preferred to vi by e
vi
j . By the preferences of
evij , agent ej is the only one that is preferred to vi by e
vi
j . Thus, M(e
vi
j ) = ej .
Now, let us consider agents ev`j and v`. We have just reasoned that M(ej) = e
vi
j . By the
fourth and the fifth statements, v` is matched to some agent from S ∪ T . Thus, agent ev`j is either
unmatched under M or receives an agent that is worse than v`. However, since M is stable it must
hold that v` receives an agent M(v`) which it prefers to e
v`
j . By the preferences of v` and by the
fourth and the fifth statements, this partner can only be some agent from T . (of Claim 1) 
Now, we show that (G = (V,E), k) is a yes-instance for Independent Set if and only if M0
can be transformed into a stable matching by only performing b-interchanges, i.e., there exists a
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stable matching which is reachable from M0.
Correctness of the construction. For the “if” direction, let M be a stable matching reachable
from M0. We claim that V
′ = {vi | M(vi) ∈ S} forms an independent set of size k for G. First of
all, by Claim 1(5) there are exactly k vertex agents that have partners in S. Thus, |V ′| = k. That
V ′ is an independent set follows from Claim 1(6).
For the “only if” direction, let V ′ be an independent set of size k with V ′ = {vr1 , vr2 , . . . , vrk}
and V \ V ′ = {vz1 , vz2 , . . . , vzn−k}. We perform several stages of b-interchanges in order to obtain a
stable matching.
1. For each i ∈ [k], let Mi = b-inter(Mi−1, {vri , si}). Since {vri , si} is a blocking Mi−1 and
M(vri) = bri and M(si) = ai can be matched to each other, it follows that Mi is indeed a
matching. Thus, Mi is obtained by performing a b-interchange by {vri , si} for Mi−1. After
performing these b-interchanges, we obtain a matching Mk for which no blocking pair involves
an agent from S.
See the following figure for an illustration.
vri
ai
bri
si
Mi−1 :
 
vri
ai
bri
si
Mi :
2. For each i ∈ [n− k], let Mk+i = b-inter(Mk+i−1, {vzi , ti}). Since {vzi , ti} is a blocking Mk+i−1
and M(vzi) = bzi and M(ti) = ai+k can be matched to each other, it follows that Mk+i
is indeed a matching. Thus, Mk+i is obtained by performing a b-interchange by {vzi , ti}
for Mk+i−1. After performing these b-interchanges, we obtain a matching Mn for which no
blocking pair involves an agent from S ∪ T .
See the following figure for an illustration.
vzi
ai+k
bzi
ti
Mk+i−1 :
 
vzi
ai+k
bzi
ti
Mk+i :
3. For each edge ej ∈ E, assume that ej = {v, v′} such that M0(xj) = evj and M0(cj) = ev
′
j .
Mn admits the following blocking pairs {ej , evj}, {fj , evj}, {ej , ev
′
j }, {fj , ev
′
j }, {xj , yj}, {cj , dj}.
Then, do the following.
- If v′ /∈ V ′, then since both {ej , evj} and {xj , yj} are blocking matching Mn+2j−2 we let
Mn+2j−1 = Mn+2j−2 − {ej , yj} − {xj , evj} + {ej , evj} + {xj , yj}. Afterwards, in Mn+2j−1 no
blocking pair involves an agent from {ej , evj , xj , yj}.
Both {fj , ev′j } and {cj , dj} are still blocking matchingMn+2j−1. Thus, letMn+2j = Mn+2j−1−
{fj , dj} − {cj , ev′j }+ {fj , ev
′
j }+ {cj , dj}.
Afterwards, in Mn+2j−1 no blocking pair involves an agent from {ej , evj , xj , yj , cj , dj}.
See the following figure for an illustration.
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Case v′ /∈ V ′: ej
xj
cj
fj
yj
evj
ev
′
j
dj
Mn+2j−2 :
 
ej
xj
cj
fj
yj
evj
ev
′
j
dj
Mn+2j−1 :
 
ej
xj
cj
fj
yj
evj
ev
′
j
dj
Mn+2j :
- If v′ ∈ V ′, implying that v /∈ V ′ (because V ′ is an independent set and v is adjacent to
v′), then since pair {ej , ev′j } is blocking matching Mn+2j−2 we let Mn+2j−1 = Mn+2j−2 −
{ej , yj} − {cj , ev′j } + {ej , ev
′
j } + {cj , yj}. After performing this b-interchange, no blocking
pair involves an agent from {ej , ev′j }.
Pairs {fj , evj}, {xj , yj}, and {cj , dj} are still blocking matching Mn+2j−1. Let Nn+2j =
Mn+2j−1−{xj , evj}−{cj , yj}+ {cj , evj}+ {xj , yj}. Let Mn+2j = Nn+2−{fj , dj}−{cj , evj}+
{fj , evj}+ {cj , dj}. In Mn+2j no blocking pair involves an agent from {ej , ev
′
j , xj , yj , cj , dj}.
See the following figure for an illustration.
Case v′ ∈ V ′: ej
xj
cj
fj
yj
evj
ev
′
j
dj
Mn+2j−2 :
 
ej
xj
cj
fj
yj
evj
ev
′
j
dj
Mn+2j−1 :
 
ej
xj
cj
fj
yj
evj
ev
′
j
dj
Nn+2j :
 
ej
xj
cj
fj
yj
evj
ev
′
j
dj
Mn+2j :
We have just shown, during the construction of Mn+2m, that Mn+2m results from performing
a sequence of b-interchanges on M0. We claim that Mn+2m is a stable matching. Suppose,
towards a contradiction, that p = {u,w} is a blocking pair of Mn+2m with u ∈ U and
w ∈ W . By the above reasoning, no unmatched pair of Mn+2m that involves an agent from
A∪E ∪F ∪X ∪C could be blocking Mn+2m as each of them has already been matched to its
most preferred partner. Thus, if u ∈ A∪E∪F ∪X∪C, p will not be blocking Mn+2m. Assume
that u = vi for some vi ∈ V . By construction, Mn+2m(vi) ∈ S ∪ T . If Mn+2m(vi) ∈ T , then p
is not blocking Mn+2m as vi has already been matched to one of its most preferred partners.
If Mn+2m(vi) ∈ S, meaning that vi ∈ V ′, then w ∈ E(vi) as no agent in T is involved in a
blocking pair; recall that w is the other agent which forms with u a blocking pair. Assume
that w is some agent evij with ej ∈ E and vi ∈ ej . Let v` be another endpoint of ej ; note that
v` /∈ V ′. By our construction of Mn+2m which matches evij (resp. ev`j ) to the same partner as
matchings Mn+2j−1 and Mn+2j do, it follows that Mn+2m(evij ) = ej . However, e
vi
j has already
been matched to its most preferred partner, and thus cannot be involved in a blocking pair—a
contradiction.
3 Open questions
Our hardness reduction leads to several open questions.
1. What if the given preferences are complete?
2. What is the complexity of Reaching Stable Marriage via Divorce Operations when
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no ties are allowed?
3. What is the complexity of Reaching Stable Marriage via Divorce Operations when
the number of divorce operations is a parameter?
4. What is the complexity of Reaching Stable Marriage via Divorce Operations when
the preference lists have bounded length?
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